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Abstract 
Simply put, a multiagent system can be seen as a collection of autonomous agents that 
as a whole are able to accomplish goals beyond the reach of any of its members. Agent 
interaction is widely acknowledged as the feature that provides this added potential. Since 
many, if not all, of the attractive agent interactions can be recasted as deliberations, a 
formalization for this process is being actively seek. 
Deliberations among agents resembles a dialectical process like the one present in 
many formalizations of defeasible argumentation. This paper exploits that resemblance 
by defining a framework for multiagent deliberation based on a particular dialectical 
process borrowed from a well-established system of defeasible argumentation. 
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1 lntrod uction 
Simply put, a multiagent system can be seen as a collection of autonomous agents that as a 
whole are able to accomplish goals beyond the reach of any of its members. Agent interaction is 
widely acknowledged as the feature that provides this added potential. This interaction comes 
in several flavors-coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among others-but there is one 
seemingly ubiquitous: deliberation. A group agents deliberate when they need to come to a 
mutually accepted position about some issue. Since many if not all of the attractive agent 
interactions can be recasted as deliberations, a formalization for this process is being actively 
seek. 
Since deliberations and negotiations share a common structure, successful approaches to 
either one can generate similar results in the other. Considering this, the recent findings in the 
field of negotiation can be used as a guide to tackle multiagent deliberation. The traditional 
approach for modeling negotiation resort to game theory [12]. Even though several insightful 
issues have been explored under this conception, it depends on the strong assumption that each 
agent is aware of the complete pay-off matrix ( i.e., they know their preferences and also the 
preferences of their counterparts) br:fore the negotiation begins. One might con elude that this 
assumption restrains the a.pplicability of game-theoretic based negotiation. 
A new a.pproach that has recently gained a lot of attention considers negotiation frorn the 
point of view of defeasible argumentation [9, 8, 7]. \Ve agree with this particular vie,v; in fact, 
we have argued in a previous work [16] that negotiations among agents resembles a dialectical 
process like the one present in many formalizations of defeasible argumentation. This resem-
blance can a.lso be exploited in order to formalize multiagent deliberation. Consequently, this 
paper defines a framework for multiagent dcliberation based on a particular dialectical process 
the dialectical analysis borrowed from the well-established s_ystem of dcfeasible argumentation 
defined in [6]. 
The remainder is structured a.<; follmvs. Section 2 describes the proposed frame\vork. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the behavior of this framevvork \vith a toy example of deliberation. Finally. 
section 4 gathers the conclusions obtained and outlines the future work. 
2 The framework 
This section defines the proposed frame\vork for multiagent deliberation based on dialectical 
argumentation. \Ve begin by characterizing hovv agents represent their knowledge. and then we 
discuss the different types of agents inhabiting the framework. Finall~y, we describe the dispute 
protocol that underlies the actual dcliberation. 
2.1 Know ledge representation 
Every agent must use the same coding for its knowlcdge. vVe would like to modcl the epistemic 
state of the agents with logic programs an alternative already explored in the literature with 
satis(ying results [10, 1]. Yet , conventional logic programming cannot deal with partial and 
potentially contradictory inforrnati011, a recurring situation \vhen modeling real \vorld a.gents. 
Follmving the solution suggested in [2], we adopt a representation for the agents' knowledge 
based on a defeasible logic prograrn [4], a forrnalisrn that by combining traditional logic pro-
gramming \Vith defeasible a.rgumentation avoids those shortcomings.1 
Defeasible logic programming represents knowledge using strict and defeasible rules . Strict 
mles capture certain information (c.g., Fred bcing a penguin a.llows us to conclude that Frcd is 
a bird), ancl dcfcasible rules capture tentative information (e.g., Twecty bcing a bird allows us 
to con elude that Twcety usually fiies). In this system, a literal is either an atomic predica te p 
or its negation c-vp . .:.Jote that the syrnbol (' ,.J denotes strong negation ( also knmvn as classical 
negation), \vhich should not be confused with the traditional negat.ion in logic progrannning 
( negation as failure) . 
Definition 2.1 [Defeasible logic program] A de.feasible logic prograrn is a finite set of strict and 
de.feasible rules. A strict rule has the form "l <---- p1 •. .. ,Pn·", n ~O, \Vhere lis a literal and each 
Pi is either a literal or the symbol ''not" of negation as failure followed by a literal. If n = O, 
we say that l is a .fact, denotcd "l." . A defcasible rule has the form "l --< lh, . . . , Pn ·", n ~ O, 
with the same considerations for l ancl thc Pi as bcfore. If n = O we say that l is a prr;sumption, 
denoted ''l --< true.". • 
1 for an in-deep discussion of this system we refer the interested reader to [14, 13, 6]. 
Since nonmonotonicity can be expressed using dcfeasiblc rules, we do not allow the use of 
negation as failure in the representation of knmvledge within agents. lVIoreover, in our frarne-
\vork \Ve assurne that defeasible rules do not have an ernpty body. Even though presumpt.ions 
are particularly useful in knmvledge representa.tion [4], the effect of allmving them in a multia.-
gent scenario is unclear; and subject of further invest.igation. 
Definition 2.2 [Knowledge Base] A knowledge base is a finite set KB of tuples (rule; Ag), 
\vhere rule is a rule eit.her strict or defeasible, and Ag is the name of the agent believing it. 
\Vhen needed, the set Kfl can be divided in the disjoint sets II of tuples containing strict rules 
and ~ of tuples containing defeasible rules. • 
\Ve extend the notion of defeasible logic program with la bels that allow the agent to model 
not only its own knowledge but also knowledge about other agents. Each agent uses it.s knowl-
edge to build arguments. An a.rgument represents a defeasible reason for an assertion. 
Definition 2.3 (Argument] Let KB = II U~ be the knowledge base of an a.gent Ag; a.mllet 
IIi\g (resp. ~/19 ) be set of rules cont.ained in the tuples of II (resp. ~) labeled wit.h Ag. An 
aryunwnt Afora literal h is a subset of ~-'19 , such that: 
• there exist.s a defeasible derivation for h from II119 U A, 
• the set IIAq U A is non-contradictory; and 
• A is minimal \vith respect to set inclusion (i.e., there is no A' e A such that A' satisfies 
thc two previous conditions). 
If A is an argumcnt for h, (A, h) is also called argurnent structure. \Ve say that (A, h) 1s a 
snb-aryv.rnent of (A', h') if and only if A ~ A'. • 
The set of justified literals constitutes the epistemic sta.te of the agent. A literal h is said 
to be justified only \Vhen it is supported by a justified (i.e. , non-defea.ted) argument A. The 
formal definition of dcfcat follows. 
Definition 2.4 [Counter-argument] Let Kfl = II u~ be the knmvledge base of an agent Ag. 
\Ve say that (A1 ; h1 ) counter-argues (A2 ; h2) at the literal h with respect to Kfl, if and only if 
thcre is a sub-argumcnt (A, h) of (A2 , h2 ) such that thc sct ITA9 U {h1 , h} is contradictory. • 
Definition 2.5 [Defeat] Let Kfl be the knowledge base of an agent Ag. An argument (A1; h1) 
de.feats (A2 ; h2 ) at the literal h with respect to Kfl, if and only if there is a sub-argument (A, h) 
of (A2 ; h2 ) such that (A1 , h1 ) counter-argues (A2 , h2 ) at h \Vith respect to Kfl; and either: 
• (A1 • h1 ) is strictly more speczfic2 with respect to Kfl than (A; h) (proper defeat), or 
• (A 1 , h1 ) is unmlated by spec~f¡:city with respect to KB t.o (A, h) (blocking dcfcat) 
• 
In arder to establish \Vhether A is a non-defeated argument, counter-arguments that could 
be defea.ters for A are looked for. Since defeaters are also arguments; there may exist defeaters 
for the defeaters; and so on, thus requiring a complete recursive ana.lysis. This recursive anal:ysis 
is structurcd as a dialectical free, whosc formal definition follows. 
2a notion introduced by Pool e in [11], la ter extended for defeasible logic programming in [5] . 
Definition 2.6 [Dialectical tree] Let I<B be the knowlcdge base of an agent Ag. A dialecti cal 
tr-ee for (A; h), denoted 7(.4, h) , is recursively defined as follmvs: 
l. A single nade labeled with an argument (A, h) having no defeaters with respect to J(fl 
is by itself the dialectical tree for (A; h). 
2. Let (A1, h 1) •••• ; (An. hn) be all the defeaters \vith respect to I<B for (A, h ). \Ve construct 
the dialectical tree for (A; h), l(A, h/, by labeling the root node \Vith (A; h) ami by rnaking 
this node the parent node of the roots of the dialect.ical trees for (A 1 , h1 ) , ... , (An; hn) . 
• 
As shown in [15], the dialectical analysis can effortlessly be recasted into a dispute bet\veen 
t\vo opposing parties. \Ve already mentioned that deliberations among a gents resembles a 
dialectical process: the dialectical analysis is this process. 
2.2 Types of agents 
There are two t_ypes of agents involved in this framework: regular agents and arbiters. To begin 
\vith, we discuss conditions that regular agents rnust satisfy, and then \Ve address the differences 
between arbiters ami regular agents. 
Although we are not assurning any particular architecture for the agents, a certain behavior 
is required in our fra.mework to successfully engage other agents. Since knmvledge representa-
tion h as been fixed, every agent must have an information repository capable of holding the 
defeasible logic program that. characterizes its epistemic state. l.\ aturally. they mus t. also h a ve 
a suitablc inference engine. The inference engine defined for dcfeasiblc logic programming [4] is 
appropriate making the minor adjustments needed to avoid mixing knowlcdge corresponding 
to different agents. 
E·very agent. must be aware of t.he existence of its counterpart.s by rnaint.a.ining all the 
inforrnation required to loca.t.e and access a.ny of thern. I\íoreover, it is assurned that t.hey 
underst.and the follmving set of performaüves: 
as k (A, B, e): Agent A ask B whether it believes in C. As a consequence, agent B uses the 
perforrnat.ive tell to inform agent A about. the current status (according t.o it.s KB) of 
C. 
tell (A, B, e, D): Agent A tclls B that its state regarding C is D . This performative usually 
comes as a response to an ask. There are three possible sta tes D for the literal e: 
• lf the literal is believed, then D = yes. 
• lf the literal is not believed . then D = no. 
• lf the literal is neither b elieved nor disbelieved, then D = 7. 
why (A, B, e): Agent. A asks B ,vhy C should b e b elieved. If A still believes in C, agent A 
an:·nvers with a because providing one of the arguments justifying C. Otherwise. agent 
A answers with a tell lett.ing agent B know its current opinion over C . 
be cause ( A, B, e, D) : Agent A hands uver tu B a.n a.rgument C justifying D . l.\ atura.lly, this 
performat.ives rnakes sense only over believed lit.era.ls. It usually comes as a response to a 
why, but. it is also used throughout delib erat ions. 
engage (A, B, e, D): Agent A lcts E know that it wants to delibera te abont e arbitratcd by D. 
As a consequence, a.gent E decides vdwther it is willing to delibera.t.e ( a.nswering with a.n 
accept) or no t. ( armvering 'vith a. re j e ct). 
accept (A, B, e, D): Agent A a.grees to delibera te with E about. e arbit.rated by D. A t. this 
sta.ge, a.gents A a.nd B begin to deliberate a.ccording to the dispute protocol defined later 
in sect.ion 2.3. 
reject(A,B,e,D): Agent A refuses to delibera.t.e with E about. e arbit.rated by D. AgentE 
rna.y retry a.nother engage rnodifying t.he subject. or the a.rbiter previously proposed. 
Additiona.lly, the a.gents rnay implement other perforrnatives or even a. full agent comrnunica.t.ion 
langua.ge such as KQ~'IL [3] or FIPA. 
Fina.lly, a.rbiters ensure tha.t delibera.t.ions arnong regular a.gent.s obey t.he guidelines esta.b-
lished by the frame\vork. They have the structure of a regular agent vvith the a.ddit.ion of an 
argument pool. Since the a.rgument pool is only used in deliberations , its role is described in 
the sequel along \Vith the dispute protocol. 
2.3 Deliberation protocol 
Given the relevance of deliberation in multia.gent. systems, severa.l protocols that cha.ra.cterize 
the deliberation process ha.ve been proposed [12, 8, 9]. Still , the protocol is only a. part of this 
process: there are actions to be performed befare and after the dclibcration itself. 
Thercfore, we dccomposc a dclibcration in the following steps: 
l. An agent decides that it needs to ddiberate about a certain matter with another agent. 
2. The a.gent engages the chosen counterpart. It contacts the other a.gent through an engage. 
lf the agent gets an accept, the deliberat.ion is rea.dy to begin. Othenvise, the agent can 
either change the subject, propose another m·biter, or give up the ddiberation attempt. 
3. The actual deliberation ta.kes place. In this step, the deliberation is performed according 
to the dispute protocol defincd bclow. 
4. The outcome of the deliberation is accounted. 
N ot.ice hmv arbit.ers are summoned before the beginning of the act.ua.l delibera.t.ion. Even 
though we endorse conceiving coordination and coopera.tion as a by-products of delibera.tion 
among many a.gents, we restrict our anal:ysis to disputes benveen pairs of agents. The extension 
to the general case is under development. 
The term "ddiberation" has bcen used with diverse meanings in the literaturc. In our 
framework, wc understand it to be the proccss that allows an agent to persuade another agcnt 
about. sorne rnatter: an agent preva.iling in a deliberation can influence the episternic st.at.e of 
its counterpart.. Briefl.y st.a.t.ed, delibera.t.ions in this framework are strict.ly over cla.ims (i.e. , 
literals), a.ml can t.a.ke place involving only two regular a.gents: a proponen t. backing the claim, 
and an opponent. usually rej ect ing it. 
D efinition 2.7 [Deliberation] Let Ag1 and Ag2 be regular agents, and let h b e a literal b elieved 
by Aq1 • Then , agent Ag1 can delibera te vvith Aq2 over h arbit rated by an a.rbiter Ar if a.nd 
onl:y if: 
• agent Ag2 accepts thc tcrms of thc dcliberation, and 
• the strict knowlcdge of both agents is consistcnt (i.c., IIA.91 U IIA.92 lf 1_). 
• 
Thc consistcncy precondition in a dclibcration avcrts thosc disputes that cannot be scttlcd 
in any wa~y (i.e., thc confiict can be traccd back to thc strict knowlcdgc). Unfortunatcly, onc 
may argue that this prccondition is too rcstrictive since it prcvcnts agents from dclibcrating 
a bout. a.ny issue once a conflict a.rises between t. he st.rict part of t.heir know ledge. As a future 
\vork, 've expect. t.o refine t.his precondition into a less rest.rictive one. 
Definition 2.8 [Dispute] Let. Ag1 a.nd Ag2 be t.v,ro regular agent.s, a.nd let. Ar be a.n a.rbiter. 
Suppose that Aq1 proposed Ag2 to delibera te over a claim h arbitrated b:y Ar, and that Aq2 
accepted the proposal. Then, a dispute benveen agents Aq1 and Aq2 over h arbitrated by Ar 
follows this schcmc: 
l. The proponent ( agent Ag1 ) init.iates the discussion providing the arbiter ( agent Ar) with 
a justified argument (justified according to its KB) supporting h. The performative 
because is uscd to convcy this initial argumcnt to thc arbitcr. Thc turn gocs to thc 
opponent (agcnt Ag2 ). 
2. The opponent (agent Ag2 ) either relinquish its turn or rebuts (according to its KB) an 
argumcnt prcviously poscd by its countcrpart. In the formcr, thc turn gocs back to thc 
proponcnt ( agent Afll). In thc lattcr, thc rcbutting argumcnt is scnt to thc ar·bitcr through 
a because, passing the turn to the proponent. 
3. Thc proponcnt (agcnt Ag1 ) must rcbut (according to its KB) an argumcnt previousl.Y 
poscd b,y its countcrpart. If it can, the pcrformativc because providcs thc arbitcr with 
the rebutting argurnent, and the t.urn goes back to the opponent (agent Ag2 ). In any 
ot.her case, the dispute is over. 
• 
A::; u::;ual, the proponent. bear::; the burden of the proof. Before taking into account the 
po::;sible outcorne::; of a deliberat.ion, let us delve into the bookkeeping perfonned by the arbiter 
amidst the dispute. The arbiter begins by checking '\Vhether the deliberation may proceed. 
In order to guarantee the consistency precondition, both the proponent and the opponent 
declare to the arbiter their current strict knowledge, and the arbiter stores it in its KB. Once 
dclibcrating, thc arbitcr must verify thc validit~y of evcry movc madc b~y the contendcrs. To 
this purposc, thc conditions on argumcnts are chccked (sec dcfinition 2.3), ancl thc rebutting 
argurnent.s a.re verified 'vit.h respect. t.o the corresponding KB. 
The a.rbiter also keeps track of every argurnent. st.ructure int.roduced t.hroughout the dispute 
using its argurnent pool. This argument. pool is organi,ed as follows. 
Definition 2.9 [Argument pool] An argument pool is a set of sequences composed by pairs 
((A, h) , Ag ), where each pair contains an argument structure and the name of the agent that 
introduced this argument. structure. • 
As t.he discussion progress, the argument pool st.ores t.he (partial) argument.at.ion lines being 
developed in the deliberation. Finally, in order to avoid the so-called falla.cious argumentation 
[13, 6] the arbiter irnpose some extra restriction on the argurnent structures that are allmved 
to be introduced on a given sta.ge of the dispute. 
Definition 2.10 [Acceptable move] Let (B, h) be an argument structure of the proponent 
(agent Ag1), and let (C, h') be a.n argument structure of the opponent (agent Ag2). In this set-
ting, the proponent can move (B, h) to rebut (C, h') if and only if the pool of arguments contains 
at least one sequence "\Vith [( (A1, h1), Ag1), ( (A2, h2 ), Ag2 ), .•. , ( (An, hn), Ag1), ( (C, h'), Aq2)] as 
it.s prefix, and also the following condit.ions are met: 
• (B, h) rebuts (C, h') according to t.he knowlcdge base of Ag1 . 
• [( (A1, h1), Ag1 ), ((A~, h2), Ag2), ... , ( (An, hn), Ag,), ( (C, h'), Ag2), ( (B, h), Ag1 )] does not ap-
pear as prefix of any sequence already present in the argument pooL 
• in [( (A1. h1), Aq1), ( (A2, h2); Aq2), ... , ( (An)ln), Aq1), ( (C, h'), Aq2), ( (B)1), Ag1)], a.ll the 
arguments introduced by the same agent are non-contradictory; and 
• the argument (B, h) is not a sub-argument of t.he arguments posed by agent. Ag1 in t.he 
sequence [( (A1, h1), Ag1), ( (A2, h2), Ag2), ... , ( (An, hn), Agi), ( (C, h'), Ag2)]. 
If these conditions are rnet, the argument pool is updated by adding the pair ( (B; h); Ag1 ) 
to the sequence [( (A1, h1), Ag, ), ( (A2, h2), Ag2), ... , ((An, hn), Ag, ), ((C. h'), Ag2)] denoting that 
(C, h') has been rebutted by (B. h). The case where Ag1 is the opponent and Ag2 is the 
proponent is defined in a like manner. • 
Once the dispute is over, the proponent wins if every sequence in the argument pool has an 
odd length (i.e .. a.ll the argumentat.ion lines successfully sustained the at.tacks). In contrast, the 
opponent "\Vins if there exists a sequence in the argument pool with an even length. )Jotice that 
a clever agent can gain sorne additional insights into t.he belicf struct.nrc of its countcrpart by 
kecping track of the movcs made throughout t.he discussion. Finally, the out come of dcliberation 
depcnds upon which agent. prcvailcd in it.. 
Definition 2.11 [Deliberation outcome] Let Ag1 and Ag2 be two regular agents that reccntl~y 
finished a. deliberation over a certain cla.im h. Suppose that a.gent Ag 1 prevailed in the dispute. 
The possible outcornes of this deliberation a.re: 
• If Ag1 v,ras the proponent, its KB can remain unchanged. In contrast, Ag2 is now corn-
mitted to believe h (it has been persuaded to); and must update its J(fl accordingly. In 
other vwrds, if Ag2 receives an ask about h after the deliberation, it is nmv compelled to 
answer positively. 
• If A~]l was the opponent, neither Ag1 nor Ag2 necd t.o npdat.e t.heir knowlcdgc bases . 
• 
\i\le already stressed that a dcliberation encompasses more t.asks t.han the blindly compliance 
of sorne protocoL Taking account of the deliberation outcome can be particularly challenging. 
Suppose that an agent Ag1- who believes in h-engages agent Ag2 - who belie-ves in ""h- in 
a deliberation uver h, and that Ag1 rna.nages to plYva.il in it. According to our definition , Ag2 
is now committcd to bclicvc in h, but it ccrtainly cannot bclicvc in h and .-vh at thc samc 
time! Even though the actual mechanism implementing this behavior is independent from our 
frarnev,rork, we believe tha.t the outcorne of a deliberation should be treated as a percept.ion of 
the agent, pretending that the agent loosing the discussion \Vas persuaded by its counterpart to 
"see" the truth of the claim deliberated over. K atura.lly, this makes sense only in the context 
of agents that already have sorne mechanism for perception. 
3 A toy example 
This section presents a toy example that explores tvvo scenarios where different outcomes are 
attained starting from the same situation (reca.ll that the outcome of a deliberation is asym-
mctric by definition). In this examplc, agcnts Ag1 and Ag2 are going to arguc whether ccrtain 
car is cxpensive or not. 
Prior to the actual dcliberation we nccd to cstablish what is bclievcd by each agcnt. Suppose 
that both agents agree on the following defeasible rules,3 
"'expensive(X) ------< beetle(X). expensive(X) ------< new-beetle(X). 
saying that beetles-a widely known Volkswagen model-are usually inexpensive, and that the 
rcccntly introduccd ncw-bectlc is typically quite expcnsivc (at lcast whcn comparcd against its 
clder brother). Bcsidcs, thcy agrcc that crashcd can; are usuall~y not cxpcnsive: 
rvexpensive(X) ------< crashed (X). 
Since new-beetles share a lot of features v,rith its predecessor (big doors, beet.le-like shape, 
same manufacturer, etc.), both agents accept the follmving st rict rule saying that ne\v-beetles 
are a subclass of traditional beetles: 
beetle(X) ~ new-beetle(X). 
Finally, suppose that both agents know that some car they refer to as e is a IW\v-beetle , a 
situation modeled by the following fact: 
new-beetle( e) . 
To makc it more interesting, snppose that only agent Ag1 knows that this particular car is 
crashcd. 
erashed(e). 
Surnrning up, the knowledge bases of agent Ag1 and Ag2 are composed of the follmving 
information: 
beetle(X) +--- new- beetle(X). 
new- beetle( e). 
crashed( e) . 
beetle(X) ~ new-beetle(X) . 
new- beetl e( e) . 
""'expensive(X) ------< beetle(X). 
expensive(X) ------< new-beetle(X). 
"'expensive(X) ------< erashed(X) . 
rvexpensive(X) ------< beetle(X). 
expensive(X) ------< new-beetle(X). 
""'expensive(X) ------< crashed (X) . 
:3a rule containing variables st ands for all its ground instances. 
According to this information, thc following argumcnts rcgarding whcthcr e is cxpcnsivc 
ca.n be built: 
• (A1 , rvexpensive( e)), ,vhere A 1 = { cvexpensive(X) -< beetle(X).} 
• (A2,expensive(e)), whcrc A 2 = {expensive(X)-< new-beetle(X).} 
• (A~, rvexpensive( e)), whcrc A~ = { rvexpensive(X) -< erashed (X).} 
N o te that agcnt Ag1 can build all thc thrcc argumcnts, but agcnt Ag2 can only build A1 and 
A2 . Iviorcovcr, Ag1 bclicvcs in r-vexpensive(e) sincc A~ is strictly more spccific than A2 , bnt A~72 
believes the opposit.e since A2 is strictly more specific than A 1 • 
There are tv,ro scena.rios to consider. In the first place, let us assurne that Ag 1 wa.nts to 
engage Ag2 in a deliberation about rvexpensive( e) arbitrated by Ar, and that Ag2 is vvilling to 
accept. The deliberation might proceed as follmvs (where exp stands for expensive): 
Ag1 A~l2 
1.- engage (Ag 1 , Ag2, rvexp(e), Ar) 
2.- accept CAg2, Ag¡, rvexp(e)' Ar) 
3.- because (Ag1 , Ar, A1, rvexp( e)) 
4.- be cause CAg2, Ar, A2, exp( e)) 
5.- because (Ag1, AT, A:~. rvexp(e)) 
At this stagc, thc dclibcration is ovcr sincc thc opponcnt cannot makc ncw movcs, and thc 
proponent was able to successfully defend every line of a.rgumentation. The a.rgument pool kept 
by the arbiter traversed the following states: 
Pool1 = Pool2 = {} 
Pool3 = {[(A1 ,rvexpensive(e))]} 
Pool4 = {[(A1 • rvexpensive(e)), (A2 , expensive(e))]} 
Pool5 = {[(A1 • rvexpensive(e)), (A2 , expensive(e)), (A3 , rvexpensive(c))]} 
Therefore, t.he proponent prevailed in the deliberation. According to definition 2.11, agent Ag2 
mus t. update its J(B in order to believe in rvexpensive( e). 
For the second scenario, let us assume the complementa.ry situation vvhere Ag2 wants to 
engage Ag1 in a. deliberation about expensive(c) arbitra.ted by Ar, and that Ag1 is vvilling to 
accept. In this case, the delibera.tion might proceed as follows: 
Ag¡ 
1.- engage (Ag2 , Ag1 , exp(e), Ar) 
2.- accept (Ag1 , Ag2, exp(e), Ar) 
3.- be cause CAg2, Ar, A2, exp(e)) 
4.- be cause (Agl , Ar, A~, rvexp( e)) 
At this stage, the deliberation is over since the proponent cannot make any move. However. 
note that the argument pool still contains an open argumentation line defeating the claim being 
disputed. 
Pooh = Pool2 = {} 
Pool3 = { [ (A2 , expensive( e))]} 
Pool4 = { [ (A2 , expensive( e)), (A3 , rvexp( e))]} 
Therefore, the opponent prevailed in the deliberation. ='Jotice t hat the proponent , albeit 
loosing t. he deliberation, do es not need to cha.nge it.s KB t. o believe in rvexpensive( e). 
4 Conclusions 
In this papcr we havc defined a framcwork that allows agents to deliberatc, based on the 
resemblance between a dialect.ical analy::üs and the actual discus::;ion underlying deliberations. 
From our viewpoint, agents deliberate when they need to persuade other agents about ::;orne 
matter. Although this framevvork is currentl:v restrícted to deliberatíons between pairs of agents, 
the extension to an arbítrar:y number ís beíng pursed sínce we firmly belíeve that the advanced 
interactions among agents-coordínat.íon, cooperatíon, and collaborat.íon among others-are in 
fact b:y-products of dcliberation. 
Rccall that a dclibcration in this setting can proceed only if ccrtain preconditions are ful-
filled. Among thosc requiremcnt, the consistency precondition stating that the strict knowledgc 
of a.gents willing to deliberate should be conflict free ::;eems too restrictive. As a future work 
\Ve plc-m to explore new refinernents of this precondition to make it less restrictive. 
\!Ve have also suggested tha.t the deliberatíon process encompasses more than just a protocol 
outlining the exchange of informa.tion. In consequence, four sta.ges have been ídentífied. To our 
surprise, forma.lízing the final stage \Vhere the outcome of the deliberation is taken into account 
secms more difficult than characteri:6ing thc actual dispute. \iVe havc sketched a tentative 
approach for this final stage: to consider thc outcome of thc dclibcration as a new pcrception 
ob::;erved by the agent. 
Finally, \Ve have pointed out that an agent in this frarne\vork can gain insights into the belief 
structure of another agent engaged in a deliberation by examining the rnoves rnade throughout 
the dispute. This situation deserve further analysis since it models an interesting aspect present 
in the tradítional deliberations among human beings. 
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